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I.

INTRODUCTION

In Alex Lyon & Son, Sales Managers & Auctioneers v. Leach,1 the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia (the “Supreme Court”) grappled
with the contractual relationships among participants in an auction transaction
and rendered an opinion that (i) misstates and misaligns the rights and obligations
among auctioneers, sellers, bidders, and buyers, (ii) impedes the ability of an
auctioneer to reasonably control the conduct of an auction, and (iii) threatens to
artificially circumscribe the prerogative of sellers and auctioneers to assume
greater risks relative to certain bidders in an effort to expand the bidder pool in
legitimate pursuit of the highest auction price. At its essence, Leach revolves
around the Court’s assessment of bidder qualification criteria established by the
auctioneer and the consequences of the strict satisfaction, or the failure to satisfy,

*
George A. Michak maintains an auction law practice and advises auctioneers and auction
companies throughout the United States, as well as in Canada, on licensing, litigation, and contract
matters. He has taught auction law in pre-licensing auction programs in Indiana, North Carolina,
and Pennsylvania, provides continuing education for auctioneers in numerous licensing
jurisdictions (including West Virginia), and regularly speaks before various state and national
auctioneer associations. Additionally, he has served as an expert witness in auction cases.
1
844 S.E.2d 120 (W. Va. 2020).
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such criteria by various potential bidders.2 More particularly, the Court addressed
whether a supposedly qualified bidder was entitled, as a matter of contract, to (i)
demand that supposedly unqualified bidders be excluded from the auction and
(ii) be compensated on account of an auctioneer granting bidding privileges to
supposedly unqualified bidders.3 The Court also subscribed to a variant of the
offer and acceptance sequence—supposedly applicable to the formation of the
purchase and sale contract at absolute auctions (i.e., auctions without reserve)4
but not to auctions with reserve5—that is inconsistent with West Virginia

2
Id. at 125, 129–31. Auctioneers have great discretion in determining who may bid at an
auction, and may establish bidder qualification criteria to screen supposedly qualified bidders and
supposedly unqualified bidders. See BRAIN W. HARVEY & FRANKLIN MEISEL, AUCTION LAW AND
PRACTICE 228–29 (3d ed. 2006). Bidder qualification criteria may include, without being limited
to: proof of identity and address; proof of available funds and financial wherewithal; and
demonstration of a positive bidding history (with this auctioneer or other auctioneers). See Daniel
Grant, ‘My Cat Made Me Do It,’ and Other Ways People Try to Back Out of Auction Bids,
OBSERVER (Mar. 3, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://observer.com/2018/03/christies-sothebys-lawsuitsshow-what-happens-when-buyers-back-out/; see also Conditions of Business for Buyers in New
York, SOTHEBY’S (Oct. 14, 2021), https://metaverse.sothebys.com/conditions-of-business. Bidder
qualification criteria effectively serve a rudimentary gatekeeping function that may vary depending
on the nature of the auction, the nature of the assets, and the tolerance for risk of the seller and/or
auctioneer. So long as an auctioneer does not discriminate against members of a protected class
based on their membership in the protected class, the auctioneer may exclude bidders from an
auction even if they satisfy the published bidder qualification criteria. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601–19
(West 2021); see HARVEY & MEISEL, supra note 2, at 228–29. A related issue that was central to
Leach is whether an auctioneer may grant bidding privileges to someone who has not strictly
satisfied all bidder qualification criteria. Leach, 844 S.E.2d at 125. Leach involved (i) a bidder who
satisfied all bidder qualification criteria and was, thus, permitted to bid at the auction, and (ii) a
bidder who did not satisfy all bidder qualification criteria but was, nevertheless, permitted to bid
at the auction. Id. As characterized by the Court, the bidder who satisfied all bidder qualification
criteria was deemed a qualified bidder, and the bidder who failed to satisfy all bidder qualification
criteria was deemed an unqualified bidder. Id.
3
Leach, 844 S.E.2d at 124, 130–31.
4
At an auction that is absolute or without reserve, property exposed for sale will be sold to
the highest bona fide bidder for the highest bona fide bid recognized by the auctioneer, regardless
of the amount. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 19-2C-1(a) (West 2021). Also, at an absolute auction the
property cannot be withdrawn from the auction after a bid has been recognized by the auctioneer,
and (except in the case of a forced sale) there can be no bidding by or on behalf of the seller. W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-328; Holston v. Pennington, 304 S.E.2d 287, 290 (Va. 1983); Zuhak v.
Rose, 58 N.W.2d 693, 696 (Wis. 1953); HARVEY & MEISEL, supra note 2, at 47–51; Edmund H.
Bennett, Auction Sales, 31 AMERICAN L. REG. 1, 13 (1883). By comparison, at an auction with
reserve, (i) the seller may establish a minimum threshold (i.e., reserve price) below which the
property will not be sold, (ii) the property may be withdrawn by the auctioneer at any time before
the fall of the hammer, (iii) the seller may reserve the right to bid, and (iv) the auctioneer may have
the ability to tender bids against the reserve price on the seller’s behalf. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 462-328; HARVEY & MEISEL, supra note 2, at 47–51; see Patrick Bracher, Bids on Behalf of Seller
Are Valid Auction Bids if This Is in the Conditions, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (July 22, 2015),
https://www.financialinstitutionslegalsnapshot.com/2015/07/bids-on-behalf-of-seller-are-validauction-bids-if-this-is-in-the-conditions/; see also Conditions of Business for Buyers, supra note 2.
5

Leach, 844 S.E.2d at 128–29.
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statutes6 and that even the early proponents of which described as “contrary to
the general rule as to sales by auction.”7
Tethering its opinion to the seemingly laudable proposition that
“fundamental fairness” requires “all the bidders” to stand “on equal footing” with
one another,8 the Court failed to recognize that subjecting all bidders to the same
rules is not mutually exclusive with the auctioneer’s, or the seller’s, ability to
waive contractual provisions designed for the benefit and protection of the
auctioneer, or the seller, or both. As a consequence, the Court tilted the playing
field to the disadvantage of auctioneers, sellers, and certain bidders, and stripped
a contracting party of the well-established right to waive provisions intended to
benefit that party, while affording a mere incidental beneficiary the ability to
enforce contract provisions intended solely for the benefit of another.
Thus, Leach deprives auctioneers of reasonable discretion in the conduct
of auctions, restricts the ability of auctioneers and sellers to adjust terms and
conditions on a case-by-case basis to reflect situational tolerance for risk, and
affords presumably qualified bidders an unreasonable and unwarranted
advantage vis-a-vis the seller and other potential bidders by allowing them to
usurp control over the auction with the presumed right to exclude supposedly
unqualified bidders. Additionally, the Court’s unnecessary adoption of an
inverted offer and acceptance sequence for the formation of a purchase and sale
contract at absolute auctions works mischief—rather than clarity—into West

6

Compare Leach, 844 S.E.2d at 128–29, with W. VA. CODE ANN. § 19-2C-1(h), W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 46-2-328(2) and W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-328(3).
7
See FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT 19 (9th ed. 1921); Harvey Hoshour,
Bids as Acceptance in Auctions “Without Reserve,” 15 MINN. L. REV. 375, 380 (1931). Typically,
and historically, an auctioneer’s call for bids is seen as a solicitation for offers (rather than an offer
to sell), and bidders are seen as making offers in the form of bids (which are not normally seen as
acceptances of any offer by the auctioneer). See W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-2C-1(h), 46-2-328(2);
HARVEY & MEISEL, supra note 2, at 47-50; Bennett, supra note 4, at 3. The fall of the hammer
signifies the auctioneer’s acceptance (on the seller’s behalf) of the highest tendered bid/offer. W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-328(2). This view of the offer and acceptance sequence has long been
recognized by American courts and is rooted in English common law. See Blossom v. R.R. Co.,
70 U.S. 196, 206–07 (1865); Anderson v. Wisconsin Cent. Ry. Co., 107 Minn. 296, 314 (1909);
Payne v. Cave, 3 T.R. 148, 149 (1789). Though Hoshour’s approach diverged from established
case law, he attempted to conceptualize a theoretical inverse offer and acceptance sequence for
absolute actions by arguing that an auctioneer’s call for bids should be seen as an offer to sell and
each bid should be seen an acceptance of that offer—thus, preventing the withdrawal of the
auctioneer’s offer after its acceptance through the first bid. Hoshour, supra note 7, at 377, 389–90.
Hoshour’s approach was incorporated into secondary sources, and, effectively, became the tail
wagging the dog with respect to its gradual incursion into the common law in several jurisdictions
in the United States, where it has been recognized, by rote, without critical analysis. See, e.g.,
Pitchfork Ranch Co. v. Bar TL, 615 P.2d 541, 548-49 (Wyo. 1980); Pyles v. Goller, 674 A.2d 35,
39–40 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995); Holston, S.E.2d at 290–91; Washburn v. Thomas, 37 P.3d 465,
467 (Colo. App. 2001). Hoshour’s theory has not, however, been accepted by the various state
legislatures, including the West Virginia legislature. See, e.g. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-2C-1(h),
46-2-328.
8

Leach, 844 S.E.2d at 132–33.
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Virginia law. Fortunately, Leach leaves open the possibility for the parties to
allocate risks, rights, responsibilities, and remedies through carefully crafted
contracts (including the Bidder Terms and Conditions);9 indeed, placing an
imperative on the contractual language going forward.
In this article, the author proposes to demonstrate that the Leach Court
(i) failed to recognize the nature of, and the parties to, the various contracts
involved in an auction transaction, (ii) failed to recognize the purpose, and the
beneficiaries, of bidder qualification provisions, and (iii) embraced an inverse
offer and acceptance sequence supposedly applicable to absolute auctions but
not to auctions with reserve (elevating what should have been errant dicta to
unnecessary holding that is inconsistent with applicable West Virginia statutes).
While courts typically decide issues as presented by the litigants,10 and while the
briefs filed in this case did not direct the Court’s attention to the pertinent issues
that should have been dispositive, Leach ignores applicable statutes and is
disruptive to contractual rights historically recognized under the common law of
West Virginia and throughout the United States. Consequently, Leach muddles
the law applicable to auctions. Finally, the author suggests a contractual approach
to unambiguously articulate the rights and responsibilities of various auction
participants so as to step out of the unfortunate shadow cast by Leach.
II.

BACKGROUND

The auction in Leach was advertised as an “absolute sale” with a
minimum opening bid of $200,000.11 Bidders were required to (i) register for the
auction, (ii) make a $20,000 registration deposit, and (iii) provide a bank letter
of credit supporting the ability to purchase the property.12 Leach satisfied the
bidder qualification requirements and was deemed to be a qualified bidder.13 An
individual named Lerch tendered the first bid at $200,000, whereafter Leach
joined the bidding, which then proceeded competitively between Leach and
Lerch until Leach was declared the winning bidder at $265,000.14 Subsequently,
Leach determined that Lerch had not satisfied the published bidder qualification
provisions, and sued the auctioneer—alleging breach of contract—because a
supposedly unqualified bidder was permitted to bid, thereby inflating the
9

See Leach, 844 S.E.2d at 131.
See, e.g., Vancil v. Poulson, 236 Or. 314, 320–21 (1964).
11
Id. at 123. Both the trial court and the Supreme Court recognized that a minimum opening
bid requirement is inconsistent with an absolute auction, being more akin to a disclosed reserve,
but concluded that the auction became absolute once the minimum bid threshold was crossed.
Leach v. Alex Lyon & Son, Sales Managers & Auctioneers, Inc., No. 17-C-110, 2018 WL
10610783, at *4 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 5, 2018), aff’d, 844 S.E.2d 120 (W. Va. 2020); Leach, 844
S.E.2d at 124–25. Without debating the validity of this proposition, the outcome of the case should
not have been affected regardless of whether the auction was absolute or with reserve.
12
Leach, 844 S.E.2d at 132.
13
Id. at 124.
10

14

Id.
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hammer price.15 The auctioneer countered that the bidder qualification
provisions were waived for Lerch because he had a prior bidding history with
the auctioneer.16 The trial court concluded that the bidder qualification provisions
afforded Leach the ability to demand that all bidders strictly satisfy the
established qualification criteria, and, thus, granted summary judgment in favor
of Leach, holding that that the auctioneer breached its contract with Leach.17 The
trial court also disqualified Lerch as a bidder and awarded $68,867.50 in
damages to Leach.18 The Supreme Court adopted the trial court’s reasoning and
affirmed.19
III.

CONTRACTS INVOLVED IN AUCTION TRANSACTIONS

Fundamentally, three principal categories of contract are implicated in
an auction transaction: first, there is the contract between the auctioneer and the
seller pursuant to which the auctioneer is engaged to expose the seller’s property
for sale via competitive bidding; second, there is a separate contract between the
auctioneer and each individual bidder, memorialized by the auctioneer’s Bidder
Terms and Conditions; and third, there is a purchase and sale contract between
the seller and the winning bidder, formed with the fall of the auctioneer’s
hammer. These essential relationships were recognized in the early English case
of Warlow v. Harrison.20 Additionally, there has been judicial recognition of a
contract between the seller and each bidder that is separate from—and collateral
to—the purchase and sale contract between the seller and the winning bidder.21
For any auction-related discussion to be meaningful, it is necessary to
identify the specific contract at issue and to understand the manner and moment
of its formation. While judicial discussions of contract formation at auction are
15
Id. “Hammer price” is a term of art in the auction industry representing the amount of the
final bid accepted by the auctioneer with the fall of the hammer (or termination of bidding). See
Winstead v. Kenyon, 182 So. 3d 1087, 1089 n.9 (La. Ct. App. 2015); Auction Terminology: A
Glossary,
SOTHEBY’S,
https://www.sothebysinstitute.com/news-and-events/news/auctionterminology (last visited Nov. 15, 2021).
16
Leach, 844 S.E.2d at 124.
17

Id.
Id. at 125.
19
Id. at 133.
20
1 El. & El. 309, 316–17 (1859).
21
See, e.g., Drew v. Deere Co., 241 N.Y.S.2d 267, 269 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963) (citing Gower,
Auction Sales of Goods Without Reserve, 68 L.Q. REV. 457 (1952)); Zuhak v. Rose, 58 N.W.2d
693, 696 (Wis. 1953); c.f., United States v. Blair, 193 F.2d 557, 560 (10th Cir. 1952); Hessel v.
Christie’s Inc., 399 F.Supp.2d 506, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Finnish Fur Sales Co. v. Juliette Shulof
Furs, Inc., 770 F.Supp. 139, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Wilson Freight Co., 30 B.R. 971, 975
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); Early Auction Co. v. Koelzer, 114 So.3d 1038, 1041–42 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2013); Central Connecticut Aircraft, LLC v. State, 972 N.Y.S.2d 390, 394 (N.Y. Ct. Cl.
2011); Washburn v. Thomas, 37 P.3d 465, 467 (Colo. App. 2001); In re Premier Container Corp.,
408 N.Y.S.2d 725, 730 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978); Coleman v. Duncan, 540 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1976).
18
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often focused on the effect of the fall of the hammer, that act relates principally
to the purchase and sale contract between the seller and the winning bidder. Each
of the other auction-related contracts is formed at an earlier point in time through
the mutual exchange of promises.
In Warlow, a racehorse was exposed for sale at absolute auction, and the
plaintiff tendered a bid that was immediately topped by the seller.22 The plaintiff
refused to advance against the seller’s bid, and the auctioneer knocked the
property down to the seller.23 The plaintiff, having tendered the highest bona
fide bid, demanded that the auctioneer deliver the right to purchase the horse to
him.24 The auctioneer refused, and the bidder sued the auctioneer.25 Although
the suit was brought on a different theory, the court recognized, in dicta, that an
action would lie against the auctioneer for breach of contract because (i) he failed
to conduct an absolute auction, as warranted, and (ii) he failed to deliver the right
to purchase the property to the highest bona fide bidder for the highest bona fide
bid.26
While Leach recognized the existence of a contract between the
supposed aggrieved bidder and the auctioneer,27 the Court failed to appreciate
the nature and parameters of that contract, the purpose and significance of its
various terms, or the timing of its formation.28 Moreover, by focusing its
attention on the effect of the fall of the hammer, much of the Court’s discussion
was extraneous to the actual underlying dispute.29 Nevertheless, Leach joined the
several cases and secondary sources that have, through strained analysis (or no
analysis at all), embraced a misinterpretation of Warlow, including the faulty
notion of an inverted offer and acceptance sequence for absolute auctions that is
neither set forth in, nor supported by, Warlow.30

22

Warlow, 1 El. & El. at 309–10.

23

Id.
Id. at 310.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 316–17. The Warlow court observed that no purchase and sale contract had been
formed between the plaintiff and the seller because the hammer had not fallen on the plaintiff’s
bid. Id. at 316. The court focused, instead, on the contract between the auctioneer and the bidder
formed at the start of the auction and did not address the possibility of a collateral contract between
the seller and the bidder also being formed at the start of the auction. See id. at 316–18.
27
Alex Lyon & Son, Sales Managers & Auctioneers v. Leach, 844 S.E.2d 120, 126 (W. Va.
2020).
28
See id.
29
See id. at 127–28.
30
See, e.g., Pyles v. Goller, 674 A.2d 35, 39–40 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995); Pitchfork Ranch
Co. v. Bar TL, 615 P.2d 541, 551 n.12 (Wyo. 1980); Hoshour, supra note 7, at 375–76.
24
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BIDDER TERMS AND CONDITIONS, AND WAIVER

It is axiomatic that every contract, in any context, contains provisions
designed for the exclusive benefit of one party or the other.31 Likewise, it is well
established that a contracting party may waive a contract provision designed
exclusively for that party’s benefit.32 Typically, a party’s voluntary and unilateral
waiver of that party’s rights or protections under a contract does not require an
amendment of the contract, or consent from the other party; nor must it be
supported by new consideration flowing to the non-waiving party.33 This is the
crux of the error in Leach.
The terms of the auctioneer’s contract with Leach included not only the
steps for Leach to qualify as a bidder, but also, (i) the auctioneer’s warranty that,
if Leach was the highest bona fide bidder at or above $200,000, he would acquire
the right to purchase the property for the price established at the auction, and (ii)
Leach’s promise to close on the property should he be declared the winning
bidder.34 The fundamental issue is whether the auctioneer warranted to Leach—
or was otherwise obligated to ensure for Leach’s benefit—that only bidders
strictly compliant with the bidder qualification provisions could bid at the
auction.
Because Lerch did not satisfy the published requirements for bidding,
but was granted bidding privileges, the question also arises as to whether there
was a contract between Lerch and the auctioneer, enforceable by either party. In
this regard, American jurisprudence supports the proposition that whenever
someone participates in an auction—regardless of whether the participant
registered to bid or even knew of, or understood, the Bidder Terms and
Conditions—a contract exists between that participant and the auctioneer, the

31

Parsons v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 785 S.E.2d 844, 850 (W. Va. 2016); Hoffman v.
Wheeling Sav. Loan Ass’n, 133 W. Va. 694, 712–13 (W. Va. 1950); Smith v. Bell, 41 S.E.2d 695,
700–01 (W. Va. 1947); Gilbert v. Norfolk W. R.R. Co., 171 S.E. 814, 816–17 (W. Va. 1933).
32
The ability of an auctioneer, specifically, to modify terms and conditions that were intended
for the auctioneer’s benefit (and its support in English precedent) was recognized in David Dudley
Field’s nineteenth century efforts to establish a uniform system of procedural rules and substantive
law, that came to be known as the Field Code. See DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, 3 NEW YORK FIELD
CODES SERIES, 1850–1865 (2011). Field’s proposed civil code provisions regarding auction sales
recognized that “[w]hen a sale at auction is made upon written or printed conditions, such
conditions cannot be modified by any oral declaration by the auctioneer, except so far as they are
for his own benefit.” Id. § 899 (emphasis added). This provision necessarily directs consideration
of an auctioneer’s waiver of any Bidder Terms and Conditions to the threshold inquiry (ignored in
Leach) as to the identity of the intended beneficiary of the waived provision. Although the Field
Code is not controlling in Leach, the principal that an auctioneer may waive published terms and
conditions that were intended for the auctioneer’s benefit, is instructive, and there is nothing in
previously established West Virginia law to suggest the inapplicability of that principle.
33
See supra note 31.
34
The mutual exchange of promises renders the Bidder Terms and Conditions a bilateral
contract, not a unilateral contract as concluded by the trial court at page 15 of its opinion. See
Bennett, supra note 4, at 5; Smith v. Black, 130 S.E. 657, 659 (W. Va. 1925).
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terms of which are memorialized in the Bidder Terms and Conditions. 35
Accordingly, there was a contract between Lerch and the auctioneer (separate
from the contract between Leach and the auctioneer), certain provisions of which
were waived by the auctioneer. In all other respects the same contractual terms
applied between the auctioneer and Lerch as applied between the auctioneer and
Leach.
Both the trial court and the Supreme Court concluded that the auctioneer
did not have the discretion to unilaterally waive any provisions of the Bidder
Terms and Conditions. Specifically, the trial court held that “[the auctioneer] was
bound by the written terms of his advertisement which formed the contract,
without discretion to waive them at will and, by allowing another bidder to bid
without abiding by the terms, [the auctioneer] breached the contract with
[Leach].”36 The trial court went on to conclude that any waiver of Bidder Terms
and Conditions by the auctioneer required notice to Leach and the exchange of
additional consideration.37 Tracking the trial court’s reasoning, the Supreme
Court held that “an auctioneer cannot vary the announced terms of the sale as to
some bidders, or any one bidder, to the detriment of the other bidders.”38
However, because the Court failed to recognize that Leach was—at best—an
incidental beneficiary of the bidder qualification provisions, the Court failed to
consider that any detriment allegedly suffered by Leach was not actionable under
contract.39
The trial court’s reasoning largely overstated and misapplied the
decision of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in Pyles v. Goller.40 Pyles
was an action for specific performance brought by the high bidder against the
sellers of real property that had been advertised for sale at absolute auction.41
35

See United States v. Blair, 193 F.2d 557, 560 (10th Cir. 1952); Hessel v. Christie’s Inc., 399
F.Supp.2d 506, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Finnish Fur Sales Co. v. Juliette Shulof Furs, Inc., 770
F.Supp. 139, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Wilson Freight Co., 30 B.R. 971, 975 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.,
1983); Early Auction Co. v. Koelzer, 114 So.3d 1038, 1041–42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); Cent.
Connecticut Aircraft, LLC v. State, 972 N.Y.S.2d 390, 394 (N.Y. Ct. Cl., 2011); Washburn v.
Thomas, 37 P.3d 465, 467 (Colo. App. 2001); In re Premier Container Corp., 408 N.Y.S.2d 725,
730 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978); Coleman v. Duncan, 540 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); see
also Polit v. Grey Flannel Auctions, Inc., No. 3:19-CV-00590, 2021 WL 4844053, at *8 (M.D.
Pa. Oct. 18, 2021) (bidder bound by Bidder Terms and Conditions even though he had not read
them).
36
Leach v. Alex Lyon & Son, Sales Managers & Auctioneers, Inc., No. 17-C-110, 2018 WL
10610783, at *1–5 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 5, 2018), aff’d, 844 S.E.2d 120 (W. Va. 2020).
37
Id. at *8.
38

Leach, 844 S.E.2d at 132.

39

Atlas Powder Co. v. Nelson & Chase & Gilbert Co., 20 S.E.2d 890, 894 (W. Va. 1942)
(“[A] situation may arise under a contract by which a third party is neither a ‘contract beneficiary’
nor a ‘donee beneficiary,’ but as a practical fact will be benefited by the performance of the contract
between the other parties thereto. Such a party is an ‘incidental beneficiary,’ with no right of action
on the contract.”).
40
674 A.2d 35 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
41

Id. at 36−37.
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Key issues in Pyles were whether the sellers adequately notified all bidders of
their intent to bid (with the questionable effect of converting the auction from an
absolute auction to an auction with reserve), and whether, if the notice and
conversion were ineffective, the sellers were permitted to bid at an absolute
auction.42 Given the circumstances, rationale, and purpose of the auctioneer’s
waiver in Leach, Leach does not fit into the analytical or practical framework of
Pyles, and, therefore, Pyles is not persuasive as to the outcome in Leach. This is
particularly so considering that the conduct of the sellers in Pyles was intended
to fundamentally change the nature of the auction, even though the bidder in that
case had a reasonable and enforceable expectation that the auction would be
conducted as an absolute auction. By contrast, the winning bidder in Leach
sought to enforce rights that were not designed for his benefit, and that, in
context, could not have created a reasonable and enforceable expectation that
anyone who did not satisfy all of the bidder qualification criteria would be
excluded from the auction for Leach’s benefit.
At its essence, Leach begs the essential questions as to (i) the identity of
the intended beneficiary of the waived provisions and (ii) the purpose of the
waived provisions; and it was error to simply assume—without analysis—that
Leach was an intended beneficiary of the bidder qualification provisions
(whether under Leach’s contract with the auctioneer, or under Lerch’s contract
with the auctioneer). These are critical failures because without actually
deliberating over these issues in the context of an auction transaction, and
without recognizing the importance to the auctioneer and the seller of vetting
potential bidders for an assurance that they possess the wherewithal to complete
the transaction (or weighing the auctioneer’s and/or seller’s tolerance for risk
with respect to specific bidders), the Court did not have an adequate foundation
on which to support an informed conclusion relative to the ability of a contracting
party to freely waive provisions intended exclusively for the benefit of that party.
The threshold inquiry—overlooked by the Court—is whether the bidder
registration and bidder qualification provisions were intended to (i) narrow the
bidder pool for the benefit of supposedly qualified bidders, or (ii) provide
reasonable assurance to the auctioneer and to the seller that the winning bidder
would have the wherewithal to complete the purchase. While not specifically
addressed, this question was inadvertently answered by the Supreme Court’s
observation that “[the] advertisements and catalog required any prospective
bidder to present a $20,000 deposit [and] to provide a bank letter guaranteeing
the prospective bidder could complete the purchase . . . ..”43
The auctioneer and the seller are, unarguably, the natural and intended
beneficiaries of the assurance that a bidder has the wherewithal to complete the
purchase. By contrast, the notion that an auctioneer would design rules to reduce
the number of bidders, and to inhibit competitive bidding for the benefit of other

42

Id. at 39−40. Determining that the notice was inadequate, the Pyles court concluded that the
sellers violated the prohibition against seller bidding at absolute auction.
43

Leach, 844 S.E.2d at 132 (emphasis added).
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bidders, is antithetical to the goal of achieving the highest price, which has been
recognized as the principal goal of an auction.44 The Court’s tacit assumption
that the auctioneer intended the bidder qualification provisions to benefit Leach,
rather to function exclusively as a screening mechanism for the benefit and
protection of the auctioneer and the seller, is contextually incongruent and
ignores the legal and logical purposes of those provisions.
A significant difference between Pyles and Leach is that the sellers in
Pyles attempted to change the fundamental nature of the auction, thus depriving
all bidders of the opportunity to acquire the right to purchase the property by
tendering the highest bona fide bid, whereas the auctioneer in Leach waived
certain protections and assurances in the contract between the auctioneer and
Lerch that were designed to benefit the auctioneer and the seller. Unlike the
actions of the sellers in Pyles, the auctioneer’s waiver of bidder qualification
provisions in Leach did not interfere with the right of the highest bona fide bidder
to acquire the property for the highest bona fide bid. Moreover, had Lerch been
the winning bidder and, also, been without the financial wherewithal to close,
then the risk assumed by the auctioneer and the seller in permitting him to bid
without having presented a bank letter of credit would have been realized.45 On
thorough analysis, the Court’s conclusion that the auctioneer’s waiver of bidder
qualification provisions for Lerch was detrimental to contractual rights actually
possessed by Leach is unsustainable.
Properly understood, the bidder qualification and availability of funds
provisions in Leach were the auctioneer’s to waive. Moreover, the auctioneer did
not modify any terms in the contract between the auctioneer and Leach. Rather,
the waiver occurred in the contract between the auctioneer and Lerch, with
respect to whom the auctioneer exhibited an enhanced tolerance for risk. There
is nothing in either the auctioneer’s contract with Lerch or the auctioneer’s
contract with Leach that gave Leach the right to have all, or any, of the provisions
in Lerch’s contract strictly enforced. While the bidders were each burdened by
the bidder qualification provisions in their separate contracts with the auctioneer,
a fair reading of those provisions shows that the auctioneer did not warrant to
any bidder that the bidder pool would be restricted to only those who satisfied
the bidder qualification criteria.46 Thus, Leach, as a mere incidental beneficiary,

44
See Kline v. Fineberg, 481 So. 2d 108, 109 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (citations omitted);
see also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 19-2C-1 (West 2021).
45
Because the required bank letter of credit was in the amount of the $200,000 minimum bid,
and not more, this screening requirement did not guarantee performance beyond the amount of the
opening bid, and, thus, could only provide a reasonable assurance that a bidder ought to be able to
close. Having interacted with Lerch previously (see Leach, 844 S.E.2d at 124), the auctioneer
found reasonable assurance elsewhere, and was entitled to do so.
46
It is a wholly different case if a winning bidder can plead, and prove, that a competing
unqualified bidder at an absolute auction was a shill, rather than a bona fide bidder. That, however,
is not the rationale adopted by the Court; nor do the facts, as recited in Leach, support such a
finding. Simply put, Lerch’s failure to satisfy all the bidder qualification requirements did not,
under the circumstances, deprive him of bona fide bidder status.
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was without the power to enforce the bidder qualification provisions with regard
to Lerch, or to demand strict compliance with those provisions.47 Moreover, the
Court’s approach to placing all bidders on “equal footing”48 becomes
unmanageable when put in context of the entire spectrum of possible bidder
qualification criteria. While the bidder qualification provisions at issue in Leach
spoke to the financial wherewithal of bidders, at a vast majority of auctions—
particularly those involving assets of lesser value—the principal bidder
qualification criteria may be presentation of a driver’s license in order to identify
the bidder and verify an address. Applying Leach on a consistent basis would
require an auctioneer to deny bidding privileges to anyone who—for whatever
reason—failed to produce a driver’s license, including, friends, family members,
professional acquaintances, regular auction attendees, and even the seller at a
reserve auction at which the seller is able to bid. This yields an absurd result,
particularly considering that the proof of identity requirement should not be
viewed as a mechanism for limiting the bidder pool for the benefit of competing
bidders, and considering, further, that there may be circumstances under which
it is not necessary for an auctioneer to verify the identity of bidders who are
known to the auctioneer. Leach, thus, imposes a disorienting haze over the
practice of auctioneering in West Virginia.
In 2016, a similar unqualified bidder case was tried to verdict before a
California jury. In Village at Redlands Group LP v. Auction.com,49 the Bidder
Terms and Conditions required potential bidders to, among other things, show
$2,850,000 in readily available funds in a deposit account.50 While the winning
bidder satisfied the bidder qualification provisions, a competing bidder was
granted bidding privileges without showing $2,850,000 on deposit.51 The
supposedly unqualified bidder became the back-bidder, and the winning bidder
sued the auctioneer for, among other things, breach of contract.52 The jury found
that a contract existed between the qualified winning bidder and the auctioneer,
but found no breach of contract.53 The outcome in Village at Redlands Group
supports the conclusion that, while a presumably qualified bidder may be an
incidental beneficiary of the strict enforcement of an auctioneer’s bidder
qualification provisions, such bidder does not acquire the right to enforce those

47
48

Atlas Powder Co. v. Nelson & Chase & Gilbert Co., 20 S.E.2d 890, 894 (W. Va. 1942)
Leach, 844 S.E.2d at 132.

49

No. 30201500777483, 2016 WL 11201302 (Cal. Super. Aug. 29, 2016).
Id. at *1.
51
Id. at *4. The supposedly unqualified bidder had, however, secured financing, could close
within 30 days, and was known to the seller.
52
Id. at *1.
53
Village at Redlands Group LP v. Auction.com, Inc., No. 30201500777483, 2017 WL
9288861, at *1 (Cal. Super. Mar. 24, 2017).
50

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2021

11

West Virginia Law Review Online, Vol. 124, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 1

30

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 124

provisions so as to exclude other bidders, or to seek damages from the
auctioneer.54
In addition to setting out the contractual rights and responsibilities of the
auctioneer and each bidder and identifying terms to be incorporated into the
purchase and sale contract between the seller and the buyer, Bidder Terms and
Conditions should educate sellers, bidders, buyers, lawyers, regulators, and
judges, who are—all too often—unfamiliar with the auction industry and its
nuances. Additionally, because the Bidder Terms and Conditions typically form
the basis of the purchase and sale contract that arises with the fall of the hammer,
another unfortunate possible consequence of Leach must be acknowledged.
Following Leach to the full extent of its natural reach raises the question as to
whether the seller would have the ability to waive terms in the purchase and sale
contract after the buyer is determined by the fall of the hammer. In In re Premier
Container Corp,55 the court observed that “[t]he owner of property offered for
sale at auction has the right to prescribe the manner, conditions and terms of sale,
although he may waive compliance by the purchaser with the conditions.”56 This
proposition tracks the ability of a contracting party to waive terms and conditions
intended for that party’s benefit.57 However, Leach arguably gives a non-winning
bidder the ability to complain that by waiving any conditions to the purchase
after the auction (including, without being limited to, adjustments to payment
terms, closing date, or price), the seller places the winning bidder in a more
favorable position than other bidders to whom such modifications or
accommodations were not available on the face of the Bidder Terms and
Conditions. As such, Leach’s legacy may include the empowerment of certain
bidders (including losing bidders) to control both the auction and the ultimate
purchase and sale transaction well after the fall of the hammer.
Fortunately, Leach leaves open the door for—and increases the
significance of—Bidder Terms and Conditions in identifying and allocating
rights and responsibilities and alerting bidders to the possibility of waiver in
appropriate cases. The following sample language drafted by the author for
inclusion in an auctioneer’s Bidder Terms and Conditions addresses the issue at
the core of the Leach case:

54

Bidder Terms and Conditions typically incorporate numerous provisions including, without
being limited to: bidder identification; pre-auction inspection; risk allocation (including property
condition and AS IS disclaimers); payment; pick-up and removal; bid retraction; absentee bids;
buyer’s premium; title, possession, and risk of loss; taxes; jurisdiction, venue, and choice of law;
and remedies—any of which provisions might be subject to waiver under appropriate
circumstances. Leach’s approach to treating all bidders alike under all circumstances has
potentially far-reaching consequences that do not appear to have been within the Court’s
contemplation, and that do not fit into established rules of contract articulated in the West Virginia
cases and statutes.
55
408 N.Y.S.2d 725, 730 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
56
Id. at 730.
57

See supra note 31.
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Bidder Registration; Bidder Qualification; Waiver. YOU
must register to bid. Auctioneer may establish such Bidder
Registration requirements and Bidder qualification criteria as
determined, in Auctioneer’s discretion, to be reasonably
necessary or appropriate. In order to register to bid, YOU must
provide such information (including identifying and financial
information) as requested by Auctioneer. Auctioneer may refuse
to accept a Bidder Registration from any potential Bidder, may
refuse to grant bidding privileges to any potential Bidder, and
may revoke the Bidder Registration or bidding privileges of any
Bidder. Auctioneer may, in Auctioneer’s absolute discretion,
receive bids from a person or entity that has not registered to bid,
and/or has not satisfied all requirements for Bidder Registration,
and, by bidding, such person or entity will be bound by
Auctioneer’s Bidder Terms and Conditions. Bidder qualification
and registration provisions are intended for the benefit of
Auctioneer and Seller, and create no rights or interests in any
other persons, including competing Bidders. Auctioneer and/or
Seller may (but will not be required to) waive any Bidder
qualification and/or registration provisions, either globally or on
a case-by-case basis.
This language captures the natural intent and understanding within the
industry as to the purpose of bidder qualification provisions and the identity of
the intended beneficiaries of those provisions. While the proposed language
doesn’t change the intent and expectations currently existing among auction
professionals, the Leach decision demonstrates the importance of using clear and
unambiguous terms to manage the expectations of bidders and buyers, and to
inform lawyers and judges who may be called on to evaluate auction transactions.
This language ought to overcome the effects of Leach and, as a matter of
contract, permit the enforcement, or waiver, of bidder qualification criteria to rest
squarely with the auctioneer and/or seller, rather than allowing it to be usurped
by competing bidders.
V.

OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE

Although Leach was a bidder’s lawsuit for breach of contract against an
auctioneer, not a buyer’s lawsuit against the seller for breach of the purchase and
sale contract, the Court engaged in a lengthy exploration of offer and acceptance
in the formation of the purchase and sale contract between the seller and the
buyer at auction.58 Given the nature of the case, the Court’s foray into the
formation of the purchase and sale contract was unnecessary and should have
been relegated to dicta; however, the Court expressly adopted—as holding—an

58

Leach, 844 S.E.2d at 126.
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offer and acceptance sequence for absolute auctions that is inverse to the offer
and acceptance sequence for auctions with reserve:
We hold that when . . . property is sold in an auction with
reserve, the auctioneer (as agent of the seller) invites offers from
successive bidders which the auctioneer may accept or reject
until the auctioneer announces the completion of the sale. A bid
is the equivalent of an offer to buy the property, and no contract
is formed until the auctioneer manifests final acceptance of the
bid. . . . We further hold that when . . . property is sold at an
auction without reserve . . ., the auctioneer (as agent of the
seller) makes an offer to sell at any price bid by the highest
bidder, and the offer is accepted and a contract is formed with
each higher bid placed by a buyer.59
The rule articulated by the Court, however, is contrary to West Virginia’s
statutory definition of an “auction”:
“Public auction” or “auction” means any public sale of real or
personal property in any manner, whether in-person, via written
offers or bids, or online, when offers or bids are made by
prospective purchasers and the property sold to the highest
bidder.60
Additionally, Section 46-2-328(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code
provides that “[a] sale by auction is complete when the auctioneer so announces
by the fall of the hammer or in other customary manner;” 61 and Section 46-2328(3) provides that “[i]n either case [of an absolute auction or an auction with
reserve] a bidder may retract his bid until the auctioneer’s announcement of
completion of the sale.”62 In making the fall of the hammer the triggering event
to formation of the purchase and sale contract, and by recognizing the ability of
a bidder to withdraw his or her bid at any time before its acceptance (signified
by the fall of the hammer), the UCC treats all bids as offers and the fall of the
hammer as acceptance.63 Because the courts are required to read and apply

59

Id. at 128–29.
W. VA. CODE A NN. § 19-2C-1 (West 2021) (emphasis added). Other jurisdictions follow the
same rule without differentiating between an absolute auction and an auction with reserve. See,
e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-600 (West 2021).
60

61

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-328(2).
Id. § 46-2-328(3).
63
The possibility of bid retraction prior to acceptance, regardless of the nature of the auction,
is consistent with the long-recognized rule that an offer may be revoked any time before it is
accepted. See Taft v. Kolodney, No. 18-0514, 2019 WL 4257087, at *4 (W. Va. Sept. 9, 2019);
Payne v. Cave, 3 T.R. 148, 149 (1789); RICHARD BABINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
AUCTIONS 42 (1826). While it is possible to make a bid irrevocable, see BABINGTON, supra note
63, at 42, that possibility does not militate against the statutory recognition of all bids as offers.
62
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statutes as written when the legislature uses clear and unambiguous language,64
it was error for both the trial court and the Supreme Court to adopt a judicial
distinction between the offer and acceptance sequence at an absolute auction and
the offer and acceptance sequence at an auction with reserve.
With its holding that the offer and acceptance sequence is reversed at an
absolute auction, the Supreme Court subscribed to the theory championed by
Professor Harvey Hoshour in his 1931 law review article Bids as Acceptance in
Auctions “Without Reserve.”65 Seeking a rationale to support the prohibition
against the withdrawal of property after the start of bidding at an absolute
auction, Hoshour offered a novel interpretation of Warlow and urged judicial
adoption of an inverse offer and acceptance sequence that had, earlier, been
suggested by Sir Frederick Pollock.66 Hoshour’s application suggests that an
inverse offer and acceptance sequence at an absolute auction results in multiple,
successive, contracts, each formed by the tendering of a bid in acceptance of the
auctioneer’s supposed offer; with each contract being subject to the condition
subsequent of an advancing bid. As the theory goes, property exposed for sale at
absolute auction cannot be withdrawn after the first bid is tendered because the
bid is an acceptance of the auctioneer’s now-presumed offer.
Both Pollock and Hoshour acknowledged the inconsistency between the
inverse offer and acceptance theory and the generally accepted rule pursuant to
which the auctioneer solicits offers that are tendered in the form of bids.67 This
led Hoshour to grapple awkwardly with the rule articulated in Payne v. Cave, the
Field Code, the Uniform Sales Act, and the English Sale of Goods, culminating
in his argument that there should be special treatment for absolute auctions.68
What Hoshour characterized as “sound” but generally unaccepted “theory” has
continued to reside, largely, in the province of commentary and secondary
sources while slowly encroaching into the cases.69 In this regard, the Leach Court
noted that
In this case, we are asked to consider the unique context of
auctions, to examine the contract requirements of “offer” and
“acceptance,” and to weigh how a seller and buyer in an auction
reach a mutual assent. In the context of auctions, our research
and that of the parties reveals no controlling law on these
contract requirements in West Virginia, and a surprising paucity

64
65
66
67
68
69

Martin v. Hamblet, 737 S.E.2d 80, 83–84 (W. Va. 2012).
Hoshour, supra note 7, at 380–84.
Id. at 380 (citing FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT 19 (9th ed. 1921)).
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
Hoshour, supra note 7, at 376–77, 380–84.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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of case law in other jurisdictions. Instead, much of the law in
this area derives from legal encyclopedias and treatises . . . .70
Notwithstanding the Court’s own description of its charge in Leach, the
Court was by no means “asked to consider the unique context of auctions, to
examine the contract requirements of ‘offer’ and ‘acceptance,’ and to weigh how
a seller and buyer in an auction reach a mutual assent.” This is particularly so
considering that the contract at issue in Leach was the contract between the
plaintiff/bidder and the defendant/auctioneer, and, considering, further, that the
seller was not a party to the litigation. In the context of the case actually before
the Court, defining offer and acceptance with respect to the purchase and sale
contract, and describing the mechanism relating to how the buyer and seller reach
mutual assent, do not speak to the formation or to the terms of the contract
between Leach and the auctioneer, or to whether the auctioneer breached that
contract by allowing Lerch to bid at the auction. Not only was it unnecessary for
the Court to venture into waters that it described as being essentially uncharted,
but in so doing the Court unfortunately embraced the supposed disparate
formation of the purchase and sale contract at an absolute auction versus an
auction with reserve without finding or formulating a cogent rationale to support
its conclusion, and without acknowledging, or attempting to reconcile, the
inconsistency between the inverted offer and acceptance sequence and the West
Virginia statutes that irrefutably evince the legislature’s recognition of all bids
as offers regardless of whether the auction is with reserve or without reserve.
Instead, the Court adopted, by recitation without examination, Hoshour’s
construction of contract formation as funneled through the several cases that have
accepted the inverse offer and acceptance sequence without critical analysis or
legal support.71

70
Alex Lyon & Son, Sales Managers & Auctioneers v. Leach, 844 S.E.2d 120, 126 (W. Va.
2020) (citations omitted).
71
Id. at 126–29. The principal jurisprudential embodiment of Hoshour’s theory is found in the
Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision in Pitchfork Ranch. See Pitchfork Ranch Co. v. Bar TL, 615
P.2d 541, 550–51 (Wyo. 1980). However, Pitchfork Ranch has questionable persuasive value,
particularly considering that a careful review shows it to be a prime example of how hard cases
make bad law. In Pitchfork Ranch, real property was exposed for sale at absolute auction, with
minimum bid increments of $25,000. Id. at 545. After bidding reached $1,600,000, a ring assistant
rejected a $10,000 advance from a bidder named Florance, and the property was knocked down to
the $1,600,000 bidder. Id. Dissatisfied with the hammer price, the seller took an assignment of
whatever rights Florance may have had to enforce his $1,610,000 rejected bid and commenced an
action to quiet title. Id. at 542. Essentially, then, the seller sought to enforce the rights of the high
bidder at an absolute auction, notwithstanding the well-recognized prohibition against seller
bidding at an absolute auction. See, e.g., Drew v. Deere Co., 241 N.Y.S.2d 267, 269 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1963); Zuhak v. Rose, 58 N.W.2d 693, 696 (Wis. 1953). Openly sympathetic to the plight of
the seller (a limited liability company owned by a local attorney), and noting that “[t]his is a
catastrophic situation in which [the seller] found himself where $4,000,000 worth of his property
was being bid at the $1,600,000 level[,]” the Pitchfork Ranch court fashioned an outcome-driven
remedy that protected the financial interest of the seller under which the seller at absolute auction
and the party enforcing the rights of the high bidder were one and the same. Pitchfork Ranch, 615
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Rather than tinkering with the offer and acceptance sequence at absolute
auction and engaging in legal gymnastics to create a dubious artificial distinction
regarding the formation of purchase and sale contracts at reserve auctions and
auctions without reserve, there is a more principled approach that gives proper
recognition to the contracts and contracting parties in an auction transaction. The
Bidder Terms and Conditions constitute a separate contract between the
auctioneer and each bidder, supported by the mutual exchange of promises, that
is formed at the moment that the bidder registers for, or otherwise participates
in, the auction, and is actionable if either party fails to perform.72 Similarly, in
addition to the purchase and sale contract between the seller and the winning
bidder that is formed with the fall of the hammer, there may be a separate contract
between the seller and each bidder—collateral to the purchase and sale
contract—supported by the mutual exchange of promises, that is formed at the
moment that the bidder registers for, or otherwise participates in, the auction, and
is actionable if either party fails to perform.73 By way of example, in the Bidder
Terms and Conditions for an absolute auction, the auctioneer warrants that the
property will be sold to the highest bona fide bidder for the highest bona fide
bid;74 and the seller may, as well.75 With this recognition, there is no need to
invert the offer and acceptance sequence to hold the parties to their respective
obligations or to afford appropriate remedies.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Leach confuses and disrupts the relationships among auction participants
and affords certain bidders rights and remedies to which they are not entitled. As
such, it places a premium on the use of clear and unambiguous Bidder Terms and
Conditions pursuant to which all participants understand their respective roles,

P.2d at 549. The seller/high bidder prevailed in Pitchfork Ranch because the court concluded that
the auctioneer could not reject Florance’s advancing bid even though it did not meet the established
bid increments, and because the court adopted the inverse offer and acceptance sequence for
absolute auctions, resulting in the formation of a purchase and sale contract the instant that Florence
tendered his $1,610,000 cut bid. Id.
72
As discussed in Part III, the contract between a bidder and an auctioneer—separate and
distinct from the purchase and sale contract that is formed by the fall of the hammer—was
recognized in Warlow. 1 El. & El. 309, 316–17 (1859). Additionally, in his 1883 writing on Auction
Sales, Edmund H. Bennett noted the difference between an executory contract to sell and a contract
of sale . Bennett, supra note 4, at 4–5. However, this is not a distinction that Hoshour recognized,
and it has been blurred in the jurisprudence of the courts following Hoshour, including, most
recently, the West Virginia Supreme Court in Leach. Having fallen into Hoshour’s rabbit hole, the
Court deprived itself of the ability to focus on the actual contract between the litigating parties in
Leach, as well as the opportunities to examine the purposes of the various terms of that contract
and to conform its jurisprudence to applicable statutory provisions.
73
See supra note 21; Bennett, supra note 4, at 5.
74
Warlow, 1 El. & El., at 316–17.
75
See, e.g., Drew, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 269 (citing Gower, Auction Sales of Goods Without
Reserve, 68 L.Q. REV. 457 (1952)); Zuhak, 58 N.W.2d at 696.
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rights, and responsibilities, and are, effectively, singing from the same hymnal
at the beginning of the process (including recognition of the ability of a party to
waive contract provisions intended for that party’s benefit). The equal treatment
of bidders requires an understanding of the specific provisions of the Bidder
Terms and Conditions, including the purposes of those provisions, along with
the acknowledgment that, while certain provisions may speak to the fundamental
nature of the auction or may be for the mutual benefit of the parties, others are
intended for the exclusive benefit and protection of the auctioneer and the seller,
and are, thereby, subject to unilateral waiver by the intended beneficiaries.
Recognition, and application, of that legal and practical reality is what puts all
bidders on equal footing. Additionally, by artificially and unnecessarily affecting
the formation of the purchase and sale contract at auction—in a case that turned
on the performance of an entirely different contract—the Leach Court effectively
forced a square peg into a round hole, with attendant negative consequences
including a conflict with statute, inviting further litigation, corrective legislative,
or both.
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